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ABSTRACT
Background
The response to the next influenza pandemic will likely include extensive use of antiviral
drugs (mainly oseltamivir), combined with other transmission-reducing measures. Animal and
in vitro studies suggest that some strains of influenza may become resistant to oseltamivir
while maintaining infectiousness (fitness). Use of antiviral agents on the scale anticipated for
the control of pandemic influenza will create an unprecedented selective pressure for the
emergence and spread of these strains. Nonetheless, antiviral resistance has received little
attention when evaluating these plans.
Methods and Findings
We designed and analyzed a deterministic compartmental model of the transmission of
oseltamivir-sensitive and -resistant influenza infections during a pandemic. The model predicts
that even if antiviral treatment or prophylaxis leads to the emergence of a transmissible
resistant strain in as few as 1 in 50,000 treated persons and 1 in 500,000 prophylaxed persons,
widespread use of antivirals may strongly promote the spread of resistant strains at the
population level, leading to a prevalence of tens of percent by the end of a pandemic. On the
other hand, even in circumstances in which a resistant strain spreads widely, the use of
antivirals may significantly delay and/or reduce the total size of the pandemic. If resistant
strains carry some fitness cost, then, despite widespread emergence of resistance, antivirals
could slow pandemic spread by months or more, and buy time for vaccine development; this
delay would be prolonged by nondrug control measures (e.g., social distancing) that reduce
transmission, or use of a stockpiled suboptimal vaccine. Surprisingly, the model suggests that
such nondrug control measures would increase the proportion of the epidemic caused by
resistant strains.
Conclusions
The benefits of antiviral drug use to control an influenza pandemic may be reduced,
although not completely offset, by drug resistance in the virus. Therefore, the risk of resistance
should be considered in pandemic planning and monitored closely during a pandemic.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Antiviral drugs, especially the neuraminidase inhibitor (NI)
oseltamivir, play a major role in plans to mitigate the next
inﬂuenza pandemic [1,2]. Current mathematical modeling
studies suggest that antivirals alone are unlikely to signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the spread and impact of a pandemic, in part
due to supply constraints [3]. However, these studies also
predict that antiviral prophylaxis and treatment may make a
signiﬁcant contribution to pandemic control when combined
with other interventions, including social distancing, isola-
tion and quarantine, measures to reduce person-to-person
contact such as school closing, and perhaps the use of even a
poorly matched but prestockpiled vaccine [4,5]. Moreover, a
recently published analysis of interpandemic data (e.g., [6])
suggests that NIs may be more efﬁcacious than assumed in
previous models of pandemic control. Although it remains to
be seen whether NIs will have appreciable effects on either
the clinical course or the transmission of the next pandemic
strain [7], many countries plan to rely heavily on them,
alongside other measures.
In normal inﬂuenza seasons, resistant viruses develop in
several percent of individuals who receive oseltamivir treat-
ment [8]. Resistant strains have also arisen in treated hosts
infected with avian strains of inﬂuenza A/H5N1 [7,9].
Mathematical models designed to consider resistance to the
adamantanes (M2 inhibitors) [10] or NIs [11,12] predict that if
resistant strains suffer little or no ﬁtness deﬁcit (reductions in
transmissibility) relative to sensitive strains, then resistant
strains could spread, reducing the effectiveness of antiviral
use by a degree that depends mainly on the magnitude of this
ﬁtness cost. In such models, the rate of emergence of
resistance in individuals who receive treatment or prophy-
laxis affects the rate at which resistant strains ﬁrst appear.
Once resistant strains have appeared, their ability to spread
to many other hosts in the population depends on whether
antiviral use provides a sufﬁciently strong selective force to
offset the ’’ﬁtness cost’’ of resistance [13,14].
Mathematical models analyzed to date [11,12] predict that
the impact of resistance to NIs on the overall course of the
epidemic is largely independent of the probability of de novo
emergence of resistance in treated patients, at least for the
range of probabilities considered. In contrast, practical
discussions of measures to minimize resistance to NIs have
focused largely on the need to reduce de novo emergence by
appropriate dosing [15,16] and by use of prophylaxis, which is
thought to lead to de novo emergence of resistance less often
than treatment [17]. One possible reason for this focus on de
novo acquisition of resistance is the view that signiﬁcant
transmission of resistant strains is unlikely. Most oseltamivir-
resistant viruses appear compromised in replication, infec-
tivity, and/or transmissibility [18]. As frequently noted before,
strains bearing such ‘‘ﬁtness costs’’ would be unlikely to
spread much beyond the host in whom they ﬁrst arise
[11,12,15]. We believe that these ﬁndings, while encouraging,
do not settle the issue. In response to a pandemic, developed
countries propose to use NIs on up to a quarter or more of
the population, potentially upwards of 100 million courses if
such use were undertaken just in the United States and the
United Kingdom. This would be a dramatic increase over the
worldwide use of around 3.2 million courses in the 2001–2002
inﬂuenza season [19]. Such increased use of NIs would
provide unprecedented opportunities for novel resistant
variants to emerge, perhaps including strains with lower
ﬁtness costs than previously observed; moreover, widespread
use may create selection pressure that could permit spread of
a resistant strain despite a signiﬁcant ﬁtness cost of
resistance.
Furthermore, data from interpandemic inﬂuenza strains
and experience with other pathogens suggest that high ﬁtness
costs of resistance are not inevitable. Although two common
NI-resistant inﬂuenza mutations cause signiﬁcant ﬁtness
deﬁcits in vitro and in vivo, a third (E119V), so far found
only in N2 viruses [18], has no detectable ﬁtness cost [20]. In
other infections such as HIV and tuberculosis, the frequent
presence of ﬁtness costs in resistant mutants [21–23] does not
prevent transmission of resistant variants in the popula-
tion[21,24]. Moreover, compensatory mutations may mitigate
any ﬁtness costs incurred by resistant strains [25,26]. Recently
published surveillance data show that novel resistance
mutations in N1 and N2 neuraminidases continue to appear,
including those for which in vitro and in vivo ﬁtness is
unknown. Four such novel strains were isolated from
individuals with no known history of NI use, suggesting that
transmission of resistant strains may have occurred [19]. In
summary, it is prudent in pandemic planning to consider the
possibility that resistant strains with modest or no ﬁtness cost
might emerge at some point during the pandemic, even if
most strains observed to date have shown substantial ﬁtness
costs [27].
We analyzed a simple mathematical model to examine
several key questions about resistance in the setting of a
pandemic: (1) To what degree would resistance emerge in the
population during a pandemic if de novo emergence of
transmissible resistance is very rare? Although the emergence
of resistance may occur in a few percent of treated hosts, we
wished to consider the possibility that the emergence of
strains with limited ﬁtness cost (of greatest interest epide-
miologically) might be far lower. (2) What are the relative
roles of treatment and prophylaxis in selecting for resistant
strains (given that treatment generates de novo resistance at a
higher rate than prophylaxis, but prophylaxis blocks trans-
mission of the drug-sensitive strain more effectively than
treatment). (3) What is the interaction between antiviral use
and the use of other measures to control the spread of
inﬂuenza? (4) In conditions in which resistance does emerge,
does antiviral use reduce the size or delay the peak of the
pandemic?
Methods
Here we describe a homogeneous population model of
pandemic inﬂuenza and its control by prophylaxis and
treatment. The nearly identical age-structured model used
in our numerical analysis is described below, and code for the
numerical solutions, performed with Berkeley Madonna 8.2
(http://www.berkeleymadonna.com), is provided in Protocol
S1 in a form that can be pasted into the free downloadable
trial version of Berkeley Madonna.
The basic model (Figure 1) is a standard susceptible-
infectious-recovered (SIR) model [28], with compartments
representing the number of individuals in each state. All are
susceptible at the outset, and births and deaths are neglected
on the time scale of interest. The infected/infectious (Y)
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sensitive virus and untreated (YSU), infected with sensitive
virus and treated (YST), or infected with resistant virus (YR). In
the absence of prophylaxis, transmission occurs at a rate
proportional to the number of infectious hosts, with trans-
mission rate constants bSU, bST, and bR from untreated and
treated hosts infected with sensitive virus, and hosts infected
with resistant virus, respectively. Infectiousness is assumed to
be exponentially distributed with a mean duration of 1/v days.
A fraction (fp) of susceptible hosts (X) exposed to infection
receive prophylaxis. A prophylaxed host who is exposed to
infection with the sensitive strain (who would have been
infected absent prophylaxis) may have one of three outcomes.
With probability ep (equivalent to AVES of Longini et al. [3],
the reduction in hazard of infection for an individual on
prophylaxis), transmission is blocked. Of those blocked
infections, a proportion ap are only partially blocked, so that
the prophylaxed individual becomes immune, but does not
become sick or infectious to others [17]; such individuals move
directly to the recovered (Z) category. With probability cp, the
prophylaxis causes de novo resistance, so the individual is
infected with drug-resistant virus. In the remaining 1 cp ep
of cases, prophylaxis fails, and the individual is infected with
the sensitive virus, but follows a natural history like that of a
treated patient [3]. Prophylaxis has no effect on an individual’s
risk of infection upon exposure to the resistant strain.
Of those persons who become infected but have not been
on prophylaxis, a fraction fp are treated. In a fraction cT of
treated persons infected with the sensitive strain, the strain
acquires de novo resistance, turning them (we assume
instantaneously) into YR. In the remainder, treatment reduces
infectiousness to bST (versus bSU) per day, and/or reduces
duration of infectiousness from 1/v to 1/vT days. In model
runs presented here, the effect is assumed to be only on bST;
the code allows the effect to be partitioned arbitrarily
between infectiousness and duration, and this distinction
has almost no effect on the results. Treatment has no effect
on individuals infected with the resistant strain. At the end of
the infectious period, individuals enter the removed (Z)
category; this includes both death and recovery with
immunity.
We consider a range of values for the effective reproductive
number RE, speciﬁcally, values of RE ¼ 2.2, 2.0, 1.5, and 1.2.
These cover a range of possible basic reproductive numbers
for pandemic inﬂuenza. Moreover, model runs with the lower
values are exactly equivalent to a case in which the basic
reproductive number is higher but nonpharmaceutical inter-
ventions (e.g., social distancing, mask wearing, quarantine and
isolation, etc.) and/or use of a prestockpiled vaccine with
partial effectiveness have reduced the transmission of both
resistant and sensitive strains. Speciﬁcally, consider a virus
with R0 ¼ R
* in the absence of nondrug interventions. In the
presence of interventions that reduce transmission by a
proportion h, this virus would transmit identically to a virus
with R0 ¼ R
*(1   h) in the absence of interventions. Thus, for
example, a scenario with RE¼1.5 could represent either R0¼
1.5 without interventions, or R0 ¼ 2.0 with nondrug inter-
ventions reducing transmission 25%, or R0¼2.2 with nondrug
interventions reducing transmission approximately 32%.
Modeling Low Probabilities of Resistance Emergence
Because we are using a continuous model to evaluate
scenarios with a very low probability that resistance will
emerge (cp and cT), it is important to ensure that we do not
generate artifacts by creating a fraction of a resistant case and
then allowing that fraction of a case to transmit. To prevent
transmission of ‘‘nanocases,’’ we modify the model so that
resistant cases accumulate only by de novo emergence until
the total number of resistant cases exceeds one; only when
there is at least one resistant case can those infections
transmit. This is readily accommodated by incorporating an
indicator variable
n¼
1 whenYR   1
0 otherwise
:

ð1Þ
Model equations are:
dX
dt
¼  kSð1   fPeP þ fPePaPÞX   kRX
dYSU
dt
¼ kSð1   fPÞð1   fTÞX   vYSU
dYST
dt
¼ kS½fPð1   eP   cPÞþð 1   fPÞfTð1   cTÞ X   vTYST
dYR
dt
¼ fPcPkSX þð 1   fPÞfTcTkSX þ kRX   vRYR
dZ
dt
¼ kSfPePaPX þ vYSU þ vTYST þ vRYR
kS [bSUYSU þ bSTYST
kR [nbRYR
ð2Þ
Baseline parameter values used, and their justiﬁcations, are
given in Table 1. A number of these parameters were varied
in sensitivity analyses as shown in the Results and Protocol S1.
Age-Structured Model
The extent to which individual humans transmit inﬂuenza
is related to a variety of factors, many of which depend on
age. In generating the numerical results, we divided the
Figure 1. Model Structure
Naive (X) individuals become infected with sensitive (S) or resistant (R)
strain at rates proportional to prevalence of each strain, YS or YR.
Individuals infected with the sensitive strain may be either treated (T) or
untreated (U). Individuals are removed (Z) by death or recovery. See
Methods for corresponding equations. This model was used for analytical
calculations, whereas an age-structured version (Methods) was used with
parameters shown in Table 1 for numerical solutions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040015.g001
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initially susceptible population size Xi(0) and force of
infection kSi and kRi. The restriction on transmission of
resistant strains in this model is implemented separately for
each age class; hence, once the expected number of resistant
infections in class i exceeds 1, these infections can be
transmitted to individuals in all six age classes. Before that
time, resistant infections accumulate in an age class only by
de novo acquired resistance and by transmission from other
age classes j for which nj . 1. The population size distribution
and who-acquires-infection-from-whom (WAIFW) matrix
were taken from a study of social contact distributions in
the Netherlands, with transmission probability per contact
calibrated to achieve a desired value of RE [29]; numerical
values are given in Table S1. All numerical results were
produced using this model, which differed little from the
homogeneous model except that slightly fewer individuals are
infected in the entire epidemic (lower attack rate) for a given
reproductive number.
Treatment and Prophylaxis
We initially considered the effects of treatment and
prophylaxis separately and together; these results are shown
in Figure 2. Thereafter, we considered a combined policy of
treating a proportion of fT of cases and of prophylaxing a
proportion of contacts of cases fP. Combined use of treatment
and prophylaxis is likely the most realistic possibility during
an actual pandemic [1,4,5]. Because we were interested in the
qualitative effects of increased antiviral use, we assumed that
these proportions were equal (fP¼fT) and considered a range
of values for these proportions.
We do not explicitly account for the fact that in practice,
many of the prophylaxed contacts will be contacts of patients
(e.g., household members) who were themselves treated.
Sensitivity to this assumption that treatment and prophylaxis
are uncorrelated in the population is considered in Section 5
of Protocol S1.
Results
Effects of Treatment and Prophylaxis on Resistance
We initially assumed that resistant strains emerge de novo
in 0.2% of treated hosts and in 0.02% of exposed contacts
under prophylaxis. The ﬁgure for treatment is more than 10-
fold below those observed in clinical trials [8], but most of the
resistant viruses that emerge during treatment appear to have
extremely high ﬁtness costs [20]; hence, this can be thought of
as a plausible rate of emergence of resistant strains that may
under some circumstances be transmissible. Even at these low
levels of de novo emergence, treatment or prophylaxis, or
both, can produce signiﬁcant levels of resistance during a
pandemic (Figure 2A–2D). Once resistant strains are present,
either prophylaxis or treatment favors their spread by
impeding the spread of the competing sensitive strain.
Treatment is assumed to generate ten times as many
resistant infections de novo for ‘‘equivalent’’ use; nonetheless,
for the parameter values we have considered, since prophy-
laxis is more effective at blocking transmission of the
sensitive strain than treatment, prophylaxis creates a greater
Table 1. Baseline Parameters Used in the Numerical Examples
Symbol Meaning Value Justification
1/m ¼
1/vR
Mean duration of infectiousness,
untreated resistant or sensitive strain
3.3 d A composite estimate from recent sources [3–5]; no duration difference assumed
between sensitive and resistant strains. Note that in the present model structure
and parameterization, the choice of value for m has no effect on final properties
(e.g., attack rate) and changes timings (e.g., mean case onset) by a multiplicative
constant.
1/mT Duration of infectiousness,
treated sensitive strain
3.3 d Assume that treatment reduces infectiousness not duration. Sensitivity to this
assumption is minimal.
RES ¼ bSU/v Effective reproductive number,
untreated sensitive strain
1.8 See [42]
bR Transmission coefficient, resistant strain Assumed equal
to 0.9 bSU
Assumption for illustration (equivalent to a 10% fitness cost); varied
from 0%–40%.
eT ¼ 1  
bST/bSU
Efficacy of treatment in preventing
transmission of the susceptible strain
0.66 Assume the only effect of treatment is to reduce intensity of shedding, not
its duration; thus this hazard ratio ¼ AVEI ¼ 0.66 [6], where AVEI is the antiviral
efficacy against infectiousness. Sensitivity to the assumption that treatment
affects intensity only is minimal.
fT Proportion of infected hosts treated 0.3 Assumption for illustration
fP Proportion of susceptible hosts prophylaxed 0.3 Assumption for illustration
cT Probability of de novo resistance during
treatment
0.002 ¼ 1/500
persons treated
Assumption for illustration. Conservative, in that probabilities of emergence
in other strains of influenza are several percent and may be higher in
children; however, many of these emerging strains may be highly compromised.
cP Probability of de novo resistance due
to prophylaxis
0.0002 ¼ 1/5,000
persons prophylaxed
Assumption for illustration
eP Efficacy of prophylaxis in reducing
susceptibility to infection, or 1   the hazard
ratio of infection for prophylaxed vs.
nonprophylaxed hosts
0.85 AVES as estimated in [6]
aP Probability that a prophylaxed, exposed
person becomes immune
0 This is conservative because it maximizes the impact of resistance and minimizes
the benefit of treatment. In Protocol S1, we note that results change little
if aP ¼ 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040015.t001
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the epidemic, when resistance is rare, de novo resistance (and
therefore treatment) contributes most to the total resistance
in the population (Figure 2E); as resistance becomes more
common, transmission becomes more important than de
novo emergence, and prophylaxis makes a greater contribu-
tion to the spread of resistance (Figure 2F). Use of both
prophylaxis and treatment combines these effects, thus
efﬁciently promoting resistance in the population (Figure
2G).
Effects of Antiviral Use on the Size of the Epidemic
In what follows, we considered the effect of treating a
speciﬁed fraction of infectious cases while also prophylaxing
the same fraction of contacts of infectious cases (see
Methods). In the absence of any intervention, the sensitive
strain causes an epidemic because its effective reproductive
number RES, the average number of secondary cases of drug-
sensitive infection infected by each drug-sensitive case,
exceeds 1. Antiviral use and effective nondrug interventions
both reduce transmission of the sensitive strain, and if they
reduce it far enough, they can abort the spread of the
sensitive strain. Non-drug interventions reduce transmission
of both sensitive and resistant strains proportionally, and the
resistant strain may have a ﬁtness cost, deﬁned as
cost ¼ 1  
RER
RES
ð3Þ
reﬂecting the physiologic toll of resistance on the virus. The
resistant strain can spread if—despite ﬁtness cost and
nondrug interventions—its reproductive number RER ex-
ceeds 1.
Antiviral use retards the spread of the sensitive strain,
reducing the total number of individuals infected during the
epidemic (attack rate) (Figure 3A). Use of treatment and
prophylaxis in such a large epidemic inevitably generates
resistant strains. However, with modest amounts of antiviral
use, the epidemic is largely due to the sensitive strain, which
is more common at the start of the epidemic than the
resistant strain. Spread of the sensitive strain depletes the
pool of susceptible hosts before the resistant strain has time
to spread widely. Thus, moderate levels of treatment and
prophylaxis reduce the attack rate by impeding spread of the
sensitive strain without promoting extensive spread of the
resistant strain (Figure 3B). At higher levels of use, however,
RES is further reduced, allowing greater spread of the
resistant strain so that it is able to infect a large proportion
of the population before the sensitive strain does so. Thus,
perversely, at higher levels of antiviral use, the attack rate
increases again. For the levels of antiviral use considered so
far, intermediate levels of use are the most effective in
reducing the attack rate; low levels have minimal impact,
whereas very high levels promote the spread of the resistant
strain too quickly. The exact value of this ‘‘optimal’’ level of
use depends on the values of such parameters as the ﬁtness
Figure 2. Impact of Treatment, Prophylaxis, Both, or Neither on the Dynamics of Resistant and Sensitive Infections
(A and B) Either treatment of 30% of infected hosts (A) or prophylaxis of 30% of contacts (B) reduces transmission of a sensitive strain (green) and leads
to selection of a resistant strain (red), with somewhat more resistance due to prophylaxis than treatment, although the risk that resistance will emerge is
assumed to be 0.2% for treatment and 0.02% for prophylaxis. Proportions of the entire population infected with either strain are read on the left y-axis.
Black curves (right y-axis) indicate the proportion of the population uninfected.
(C and D) Treatment of 30% and prophylaxis of 30% (C) selects most strongly for resistance, because treatment generates resistant strains early on, and
these strains are amplified by prophylaxis. (D) shows the impact of neither treatment nor prophylaxis.
(E–G) These contrasting effects are apparent in following the cumulative proportion of resistant infections (black lines), which rises earlier with
treatment (E), but persists and reaches higher levels with prophylaxis (F). The orange curves show the proportion of all new resistant infections
attributable to de novo resistance as opposed to transmission of a resistant strain; the contribution of de-novo resistance is highest early, but rapidly
declines. Graph (G) shows the impact of both treatment and prophylaxis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040015.g002
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presence of nondrug interventions (RES and RER), and
whether prophylaxis allows individuals to become immune
(Figures 3 and 4). The mechanism for this phenomenon is
examined in the Discussion and in Protocol S1.
As one considers still higher levels of antiviral use, the
attack rate drops down to nearly 0 in the model. If antiviral
use is high enough to bring the effective reproductive
number of the sensitive strain to near or below 1, then it is
possible that no resistant strain will be created, because so
few sensitive cases will be treated that the expected number
of resistant cases emerging de novo will be less than 1. Thus,
at very high levels of antiviral use, the attack rate is close to 0,
since the sensitive strain’s spread is blocked almost com-
pletely, and the resistant strain does not emerge. For this to
occur for the parameter values used in Figure 3B, there must
be fewer than approximately 500 (¼ 1/cT) sensitive cases
treated, or (at 40% treatment) fewer than 1,250 sensitive cases
total, to prevent the emergence of a resistant strain. Thus, this
best of all possible outcomes, although possible in theory,
requires that high levels of antiviral use and other inter-
ventions be implemented very early to essentially stop the
spread of the sensitive strain. It also requires that no resistant
strains be imported from elsewhere. Such effective inter-
ventions are difﬁcult in any one location, and almost
inconceivable worldwide, hence, we do not expect that this
theoretically possible outcome will come to pass.
Effects of Nondrug Interventions
The four curves in each graph of Figure 3 can represent
either different basic reproductive numbers for the sensitive
strain (reﬂecting viral properties and population contact
patterns) or, equivalently, varying levels of nondrug inter-
ventions (lower RE corresponding to more-effective nondrug
interventions). We describe results in terms of the latter.
Regardless of antiviral use or resistance, more-effective
nondrug interventions, of course, lead to lower overall attack
rates (Figure 3A), whereas greater antiviral use leads to higher
attack rates with the resistant strain (Figure 3B) and higher
proportions of all cases attributable to the resistant strain
(Figure 3C).
In the model, antiviral use selects more effectively for
resistance when the reproductive number of both strains is
lower, either intrinsically or due to the presence of more-
effective nondrug interventions (Figure 3B), though the total
attack rate (with sensitive and resistant strains) is lower when
transmission is reduced (Figure 3A). Viewed another way,
resistant cases are a greater proportion of the total in the
presence of nondrug interventions than without them (Figure
3C). The reason for this ﬁnding is considered further in the
Discussion and in Protocol S1.
Effects of Resistance on Epidemic Size
Signiﬁcant spread of a resistant strain partially compro-
mises the beneﬁts of antiviral use (Figure 3A). Even with
extensive spread of the resistant strain, the attack rate is less
than that which obtains in the absence of antiviral use (Figure
3A). This reﬂects the assumed lower transmissibility of the
resistant strain (ﬁtness cost), as well as the fact that successive
epidemics of the sensitive and resistant strains together infect
fewer people than the sensitive strain alone would have if
unchecked (Protocol S1).
By slowing the spread of the sensitive strain, antiviral use
delays the peak of the epidemic (Figure 2). Although it also
promotes the ascent of resistance, resistant strains (if initially
rare) will take time to infect enough hosts to make a
noticeable contribution to the epidemic (Figure 4). Any
ﬁtness cost of resistance further slows the resistant epidemic.
Taken together, these effects can substantially increase the
time until the average infection occurs, especially if com-
bined with effective nondrug interventions (Figure 4). Such
delays may provide time for vaccine production, while
spreading impacts on society and the health care system over
a longer time and reducing peak loads. If pandemic inﬂuenza
transmission is seasonal, such delays may be extended by
declining transmission in the summer months; however,
resistant strains might persist in the population (at a similar
or different frequency) [30] to reappear in the next season.
Dependence of Outcomes on Fitness Cost and Intensity of
Control
Overall, the beneﬁt of antiviral use in the model depends
strongly on the ﬁtness of the resistant strain and on the
intensity of control measures. Prior studies [3–5,11] and our
model predict that in the absence of resistance, antiviral use
that blocks a substantial fraction of transmission, combined
Figure 3. Effect of Varying Effective Reproductive Numbers (RE) and of Antiviral Use on Total Attack Rate, Attack Rate of the Resistant Strain, and
Proportion of All Cases Attributable to the Resistant Strain
More-effective nondrug interventions reduce the attack rate while increasing the role of the resistant strain; intermediate levels of antiviral use minimize
the attack rate. For combinations of interventions leading to effective reproductive numbers near unity, the epidemic may take an unrealistically long
time (three or more years). Prophy, prophylaxed.
(A) Total attack rate.
(B) Attack rate of the resistant strain.
(C) Proportion of all cases attributable to the resistant strain.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040015.g003
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even stop transmission of an inﬂuenza epidemic (Figure 4A).
These beneﬁts are partially compromised by the emergence
of resistance (Figure 4B–4G), and the degree of compromise
depends strongly on several factors. Most apparent is the
ﬁtness cost of resistance. If this cost is 20% or greater (Figure
4C, 4D, 4F, and 4G), then even if resistant strains constitute
nearly the whole epidemic due to heavy antiviral use, the
attack rate may be reduced by tens of percent of the entire
population, and the epidemic can be delayed by a few or even
many months. However, if there is no ﬁtness cost of
resistance, and if the transmissibility of both resistant and
sensitive strains is high (black curves), the reduction in attack
rate is 10% or less, and the delay is no more than a few
months (Figure 4B and 4E).
Successful nondrug interventions, which themselves reduce
the attack rate, considerably amplify the beneﬁts of antiviral
use, even in the presence of resistance (Figure 4, blue and
green curves compared to purple and black curves). This
occurs for two reasons. Highly effective nondrug interven-
tions, combined with high levels of antiviral use, might in
principle abort the epidemic of the sensitive strain before a
resistant strain is generated; we have discussed above why this
scenario is probably unlikely in practice. More realistically,
the combination of nondrug interventions and ﬁtness cost
substantially reduce the reproductive number of the resistant
strain. If both strains have reproductive numbers below 1, the
attack rate approaches 0 since neither strain can spread
effectively (blue and green curves, fT ¼ fP . 0.1 to 0.2).
Our sensitivity analyses suggest that even when resistant
strains emerge at seemingly low frequencies (0.002% for
treatment and 0.0002% for prophylaxis), resistance may
signiﬁcantly erode the beneﬁts of large-scale antiviral use,
especially if the pandemic strain is highly transmissible
(Figure 4B and 4C). Resistant strains emerging in hosts who
are treated or prophylaxed will probably be genetically
heterogeneous and vary in their ﬁtness costs [20]. Over time,
the lower-cost strains will play a disproportionate part in
Figure 4. Effect of Varying Effective Reproductive Numbers (RE) and of Antiviral Use on Total Attack Rate (Solid Curves) and Mean Incidence Time
(Dashed Curves)
Mean incidence time (‘‘Inc. Time’’) is the mean time of infection of all infected persons over the course of the epidemic. Rows represent different
frequencies with which resistance emerges during prophylaxis (‘‘Prophy’’)( cp¼0, 2310
 6, and 2310
 4) and treatment (ct¼0, 2310
 5, and 2310
 3);
columns represent different fitness costs of resistance (0, 20%, and 40%). Since the resistant strain is not present at the start of the simulations, it does
not appear when cp ¼ ct ¼ 0, hence its fitness cost is irrelevant.
Graph (A) represents the case with no resistance. Graphs (B–D) represent the case when cp¼2310
 6 and ct¼2310
 5 at a fitness cost of 0, 0.2, and 0.4,
respectively. Graphs (E–G) represent the case when cp ¼ 2 3 10
 4 and ct ¼ 2 3 10
 3 at a fitness cost of 0, 0.2, and 0.4, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040015.g004
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Influenza Drug Resistancespreading to other hosts [31], and their spread is of the
greatest concern. We have considered emergence probabil-
ities well below those observed, to represent the possibility
that, for example, resistance emerges in 4% of treated hosts
[7,8,16], of which 0.05% are a strain with modest ﬁtness cost.
Discussion
In the absence of a resistant strain, our model, like others
before it, predicts that use of an effective antiviral drug
combined with other effective measures to reduce trans-
mission could reduce the size of a pandemic and delay its
onset, buying valuable time for vaccine production. If all
resistant strains have very high ﬁtness costs (e.g., 40% or
more), or if the spread of the sensitive strain could be aborted
within the ﬁrst few thousand cases, our model suggests that
the spread of resistant strains could be negligible. Such
scenarios, although possible, seem unlikely. To date, most but
not all strains resistant to the NIs seem to be handicapped in
their ability to transmit from host to host [20], but the
possibility that higher-ﬁtness strains (with costs substantially
less than 40%) might emerge must be considered, given the
unprecedented levels of NI use anticipated during a
pandemic. Indeed, we have considered very low probabilities
of emergence (as low as 1/50,000 treated cases and 1/500,000
prophylaxed cases) and ﬁnd that, if strains with little or no
ﬁtness cost emerge at these rates, resistance could spread
widely in a pandemic (Figure 4B and 4C). Although effective
measures to control an emerging pandemic may be possible
for a closed community, it seems highly implausible that these
effective measures could be implemented at a global level. As
a result, if resistant strains capable of transmission emerge in
some communities, introduction of these strains would be
expected even into communities that have effectively
controlled the epidemic from the start and averted the
appearance of ‘‘home-grown’’ transmissible resistant strains.
Taken together, these arguments suggest it is important to
consider the possibility that resistant strains with modest
ﬁtness costs (say 20% or less) can emerge at even extremely
low frequencies de novo in hosts receiving antiviral drugs.
The model suggests that, if this is the case, resistant strains
may well may make a signiﬁcant contribution to a pandemic.
Although this conclusion is pessimistic, it is balanced to some
degree by the model’s prediction that, even if resistant strains
do spread widely, the use of antivirals will likely reduce the
magnitude and delay the peak of a pandemic. The extent of
this delay depends on the exact magnitude of the ﬁtness cost
(higher cost equals more delay), the amount of antiviral use
(more use equals more delay), and the effectiveness of other,
nondrug interventions (better interventions/less transmissi-
bility equals more delay).
One of the more surprising results obtained here is that
(except for the unlikely case in which antiviral use can stop
the epidemic before a resistant strain appears) the beneﬁt of
antiviral use in reducing the attack rate is greatest for
intermediate levels of antiviral use. The reason for this
prediction can be seen by imagining two extremes: Case A, in
which no antiviral use occurs, so the epidemic simply unfolds
without hindrance from antivirals but without resistance, and
Case B, in which every individual is treated and prophylaxed
throughout the epidemic. Assuming that a resistant strain
capable of transmission emerges in Case B, the epidemic will
essentially be all resistant, but again (because the antivirals
are ineffective against the resistant strain), the resistant
epidemic will pass unhindered by treatment. If we further
assume that the ﬁtness cost of resistance is 0 or minimal, then
Case A and Case B will be almost identical in terms of attack
rate, since each will be an epidemic of an essentially identical
virus (from the point of view of transmission). Now consider
Case C, with an intermediate level of antiviral use, which is
not enough to stop transmission of the sensitive strain. Then
there will be an epidemic of the sensitive strain, smaller than
in Case A because antivirals slow its spread, but followed (at
some interval, longer if emergence of resistance is rare) by an
epidemic of the resistant strain. Because the resistant strain
will be spreading in a population that is already partially
immune (thanks to prior exposure to the sensitive strain), it
will spread less successfully than in Case B, and in particular
will ‘‘overshoot’’ less in the total number of people it infects.
Here, overshoot refers to the standard property of epidemics
in closed populations of peaking when they have reduced the
number of susceptibles to a level that can no longer maintain
growth of the epidemic (in simple models, to 1/R0), but
continue to infect more as the epidemic declines, so that the
proportion of the population that escapes infection by the
end of the epidemic is less than 1/R0. The precursor epidemic
of the sensitive strain reduces this overshoot and thereby
results in a smaller attack rate. This phenomenon is explained
more generally and more quantitatively in Protocol S1.
Another surprising result obtained here is that resistance
reaches higher levels in the epidemic when more-successful
nondrug interventions are in place, or equivalently when the
baseline transmissibility of the infection is lower. This
phenomenon, considered more quantitatively in Protocol
S1, can be understood intuitively as follows. When trans-
mission is highly efﬁcient (due to a high baseline reproductive
number or ineffective nondrug interventions), the epidemic
happens so fast that resistance does not have time to reach
very high levels; if, instead, the epidemic is slower, due to a
less transmissible virus or better nondrug interventions,
resistance has time to take off before the epidemic is over.
More quantitatively, the prevalence of resistance in the
population increases approximately by a factor proportional
to RR   RS in each epidemic ‘‘generation’’ (the time from
infection of one person to infection of his contact, which is
on average 1/m). When more-effective nondrug interventions
are in place, this increase is somewhat smaller per generation
(since RR and RS are reduced), but that reduction is more
than offset by an increase in the number of generations of
transmission in the epidemic (note that in Figure 4, the mean
time to infection, a measure of the number of generations in
the epidemic, can be two or more times as long when the
reproductive number is reduced by 25% from 2.0 to 1.5). As
an extreme limiting case, imagine an infection that had a
basic reproductive number comparable to the population
size, so that nearly the entire population was infected by the
ﬁrst index case. Even if everyone were prophylaxed and the
index case treated, resistance would occur only in those who
acquired it de novo; the epidemic would be over after one (or
slightly more) generations, before resistance had time to
increase much above its de novo emergence rate through
repeated transmission over several epidemic generations.
The simple model used here enables evaluation in a general
way of the potential impact of resistance on an inﬂuenza
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different factors (parameters) contributing to the epidemic.
It uses a simpliﬁed, exponentially distributed natural history;
however, since most of the conclusions (except for those
about the magnitude of delays) are about the ﬁnal state of the
population, and all terms in the equations can be non-
dimensionalized by dividing by the generation time, this
simpliﬁcation does not have a major effect on outcomes. This
model does not account for saturation of contacts due to
transmission within families and other small groups, and
therefore predicts higher attack rates than more complex,
agent-based models [4,5] for a given value of R0. Given the
simpliﬁcations inherent in any model and the large un-
certainties about the properties of a potential pandemic
strain and its resistant variants, we emphasize the qualitative
predictions of the model—supported by analytical reasoning
in Protocol S1—rather than the exact quantitative predic-
tions. Important predictions that we believe to be robust to
model structure are that (1) antiviral use will favor the spread
of resistance even if such use rarely generates de novo
resistant strains; (2) despite the spread of resistance,
prophylaxis and treatment can both delay and reduce the
size of the epidemic; (3) nondrug interventions (if effective)
and antiviral use—which will likely be used together in the
response to a pandemic [1,4,5]—generally have synergistic
beneﬁts, despite the fact that nondrug interventions may
promote resistance; and (4) relatively minor differences in
ﬁtness cost may make large differences in outcomes, even
when emergence probabilities are low (Figure 4). These
results extend those of previous models, which showed (like
our model) that the ﬁtness cost of resistance strongly
inﬂuences the ability of resistant strains to spread during
an epidemic [10–12].
It may be possible to reduce the risk of amplifying resistant
viral subpopulations within a treated host [7,8,15,32] by
adequate dosing and greater emphasis on prophylaxis than
treatment [16]. However, our results suggest that once
resistant strains are present in the population, as they likely
will be [7,33], heavy use of antivirals even for prophylaxis will
promote their spread by inhibiting the drug-sensitive strain
that competes with them. Thus, even a highly effective
antiviral regimen with little or no risk of producing de novo
antiviral resistance will, when used population-wide, promote
the spread of resistant strains. Similar phenomena are
observed in models of Mycobacterium tuberculosis [34], Strepto-
coccus pneumoniae [35], and hospital-acquired infections [36],
and are of concern when considering preventive treatment of
tuberculosis [37] and malaria [38].
The conclusions described here are speciﬁcally relevant to
NIs; prospects for the use of M2 inhibitors (adamantanes) in a
pandemic are considered far less promising. Adamantane
resistance is very widespread in some populations of H5N1,
though rare in others [39]. The resistance proﬁle of a strain
causing the next pandemic is, of course, unknown. However,
even if the pandemic were initially susceptible to adaman-
tanes, widespread use these agents would likely select for
resistance extremely rapidly [10], because rates of de novo
emergence are considerably higher [8] for these agents than
for NIs, whereas ﬁtness costs for adamantane resistance are
unmeasurable [40].
Although adamantane monotherapy is unlikely to be
effective, combination chemotherapy with both NIs and
adamantanes might have some beneﬁts against a pandemic
strain initially susceptible to both classes, just as combination
therapy has been useful in other infections [41]. First, the rate
of de novo emergence of resistance within hosts might be
reduced. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the spread
of mutant strains resistant to only one of the drugs might be
curtailed in the population, because treatment and prophy-
laxis with the drug combination might reduce susceptibility
and/or infectiousness even if only one of the drugs is effective.
Finally, it is at least theoretically possible that dually resistant
strains would suffer a greater ﬁtness cost than singly NI-
resistant strains, although this beneﬁt may be negligible given
the high ﬁtness of adamantane-resistant strains.
Optimism about the beneﬁts of antivirals in an inﬂuenza
pandemic should be tempered by the knowledge that trans-
missible, pathogenic resistant strains are a real possibility and
could reduce the beneﬁts of antiviral use in pandemic
control. Successful implementation of nondrug interventions
to control resistance will, in most circumstances, amplify the
beneﬁts of antiviral use in controlling the pandemic,
although such interventions may increase the proportion of
resistant cases. Because the impact of resistance is relatively
insensitive to the rate at which resistant strains emerge de
novo in antiviral recipients, efforts to control inﬂuenza
transmission overall may be of greater beneﬁt than efforts to
reduce the de novo rate of emergence of resistance. Despite
these caveats, we do not believe that concerns about
resistance should preclude the widespread deployment of
antivirals as part of the response to a pandemic. If these
drugs, used prophylactically or for treatment, are effective in
reducing transmission of the next pandemic strain, they
should provide beneﬁts by reducing the number of infected
patients and delaying transmission, even if resistant strains
ultimately become widespread.
Supporting Information
Protocol S1. Supplementary Methods, Analytic Results, and Simu-
lation Code
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040015.sd001 (271 KB PDF).
Table S1. Population Sizes and Transmission Coefﬁcients for the Age-
Structured Model
The daily transmission rate constant in row i, column j, indicates that
an infected individual in age group j has a daily probability of
transmitting infection bSUij to each of the susceptible individuals in
group i. Note that table entries are inﬂated by a factor of 10
9 for
readability. This matrix is calibrated for R0 ¼ 2.
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040015.st001 (30 KB DOC).
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Influenza Drug ResistanceEditors’ Summary
Background. Governments and health authorities worldwide are
planning how they would best prepare for and deal with a future
influenza pandemic. Seasonal influenza is thought to affect between 5%
and 15% of the population worldwide each year. Most people who get
influenza recover within a couple of weeks without lasting effects, but a
small proportion of patients, mostly young children and elderly people,
experience serious complications that can be fatal. An influenza
pandemic happens when new variants of the influenza virus emerge
against which little immunity exists in the general population. Pandemic
influenza strains are transmitted more rapidly than seasonal strains, often
sweep across several countries or continents, and make more people ill.
There are drugs that can treat and prevent influenza. One of them,
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) is an antiviral drug that works by preventing viral
particles from being released by infected human cells. Stockpiling large
amounts of oseltamivir and related drugs with the intent to treat a large
fraction of the population is a key part of pandemic preparedness of
many countries. However, it is known that influenza viruses can develop
resistance to these drugs.
Why Was This Study Done? It is not clear how the emergence of
oseltamivir-resistant influenza strains would affect the course of any
future influenza pandemic. Much research in this area has focused on
how likely the new strains are to emerge in the first place, rather than on
how they might spread once they had emerged. In the context of an
influenza pandemic, antiviral drugs would be used in a large proportion
of the population, likely driving the selection and spread of resistant
viruses. For this study, the researchers wanted to estimate the likely
impact of resistant strains during an influenza pandemic.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? These researchers set up a
mathematical model (i.e., simulations done on a computer) to mimic the
spread of influenza. They then fed a set of assumptions into the
computer. These included information about the rate of transmission of
influenza from one person to another; what proportion of people would
receive antiviral drugs for prophylaxis or treatment; how likely the drugs
would be to successfully treat or prevent infection; and in what
proportion of people the virus might become resistant to drugs. The
modeling led to three main predictions. First, it predicted that
widespread use of antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir could quickly lead
to the spread of resistant viruses, even if resistant strains emerged only
rarely. Second, even with resistant strains circulating, prophylaxis and
treatment with oseltamivir would still delay the spread of the pandemic
and reduce its total size. Third, nondrug interventions (such as social
isolation and school closures) would further reduce the number of cases,
but a higher proportion of cases would be caused by resistant strains if
these control measures were used.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest that, in the
event of a future influenza pandemic for which antiviral drugs are used,
there is a risk of resistance emerging and resistant strains causing illness
in a substantial number of people. This would counteract the benefits of
antiviral drugs but not eliminate those benefits entirely. Like all modeling
studies, this one relies on realistic assumptions being entered into the
model, and it is hard to know closely the model will mimic a real-life
situation until the properties of an actual pandemic strain are known.
Most studies, including this one, suggest that in the event of a pandemic,
antiviral drugs will have an overall beneficial impact on reducing death
rates and adverse health outcomes. However, given the sizeable effects
of resistance suggested here, its role should be considered in pandemic
planning. This includes surveillance that can detect emergence and
spread of resistant strains.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.
0040015.
  World Health Organization: information on pandemic preparedness
  World Health Organization: fact sheets on influenza
  Information from the UK Health Protection Agency on pandemic
influenza
  US government website on both pandemic flu and avian flu
(information provided by the US Department of Health and Human
Services)
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